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INTRODUCTION
The international agreement on Iran’s nuclear 
programme between the P5+1 (Britain, China, 
France, Russia and the United States, plus 
Germany) and Iran on 14 July 2015 was reached 
while Saudi Arabia, Egypt and four of their other 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) allies were 
engaged in a large-scale air campaign codenamed 
Operation Decisive Storm against the Houthis in 
Yemen – a conflict which resulted in more than 
5,200 deaths as of 29 September, and more than 
21 million people (80 percent of the population) 
in need of humanitarian assistance and with no 
access to safe water.1 This sequence of events has 
taken place while manipulation of the sectarian 
card has underpinned policy responses to the 
Arab Spring in the region and only heightened 
tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Moreover, 
conflicting dynamics have been at play within 
the GCC since 2011. Fundamental divergences 
over the Muslim Brotherhood issue, and the 
post-Arab Spring Middle East in general, led to 
increasing tensions between Qatar and Saudi 
Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain. However, all the 
GCC monarchies have shown strong cohesion in 
dealing with internal peaceful protests, including 
on the occasion of the military intervention in 
Bahrain in 2011. 
1 United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs, “Yemen Humanitarian Bulletin 
No. 3,” 29 September 2015 (available at: http://bit.
ly/1LDxJnl, checked on 12 October 2015).
In this context, this chapter analyses the 
relationship between the Gulf monarchies and Iran 
after 2011, which has been marked by a regional 
struggle for influence between Saudi Arabia and 
Iran. This confrontation has plunged West Asia 
(and in particular, Yemen, Iraq and Syria) into the 
situation it is in today, and is also characterised 
by notable divergences of views and (political and 
economic) interests among the GCC states when 
dealing with Iran and the latter’s future role in the 
region.
The GCC was created in 1981 with the aim of 
“achieving unity” and formulating common 
regulations in fields including economics, 
customs, commerce, education and culture. The 
fact that the six monarchies share similar political 
systems and international allies and have survived 
similar challenges to their rule (Arab nationalism, 
socialism and revolutionary Islamism, to mention 
only a few) has been the most solid cement 
keeping the GCC alive. However, deep-founded 
divisions and power imbalances within the council 
led to it being largely unproductive over the first 
three decades of its existence. One of the best 
illustrations of this has been the single currency. 
The Gulf Monetary Council was established on 
27 March 2010, but progress towards monetary 
integration has been negligible: Oman left in 2007 
and the UAE stormed out of the project in 2009. 
Even on security issues, structural divergences of 
views have impeded the emergence of a common 
line. While Saudi Arabia (and more recently Qatar) 
has been funding Islamist groups and militants 
abroad since the 1980s, this has been a cause for 
concern in other GCC capitals, which are worried 
about a long-term boomerang effect on their own 
internal stability. More recently, Saudi Arabia, the 
United Arab Emirates and Bahrain have accused 
Qatar of interfering in their domestic affairs and 
supporting local Muslim Brotherhood cells.
At the beginning of 2011, when it became clear 
that protests would not only take place in Egypt 
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and Tunisia but in the Gulf too, all the GCC ruling 
families agreed that they did not intend to go 
beyond what they fundamentally considered a 
red line, i.e. keeping the centre of political power 
(encompassing the executive and the legislative 
power) as their personal prerogative closed off 
from contestation. The potential scenario of a 
regional unbalancing of power driven by a lack 
of support from external allies (the overthrow 
of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt was often used as an 
example) led the GCC countries to temporarily 
set aside their differences and to find solutions 
together. All the GCC countries (even those which 
did not send troops) supported the Peninsula 
Shield intervention in Bahrain in 2011. The 
Bahraini authorities worked desperately to depict 
the uprising as a sectarian movement.2 This was 
done by not only blaming Iran for its supposed 
interference in the island’s internal affairs, but also 
by targeting activists on a sectarian basis. All the 
GCC rulers signed up, explicitly or implicitly, to 
the narrative that Iran was behind the protests. 
Obviously, this blame game served the purposes 
of the GCC’s ruling families, which by branding 
the protests as an exogenous product sought to 
avoid having to face indigenous grievances. In 
addition, the GCC countries coordinated financial 
aid to help Oman and Bahrain cope with the Arab 
Spring (an aid package worth US$ 20bn) in March 
2011.
However, this support for its weakest links (Oman 
and Bahrain) was not the first step towards 
a strengthening of the ties between the GCC 
countries that Saudi Arabia may have hoped. In 
late 2011, King ‘Abd Allah of Saudi Arabia put 
forward a plan to create a Gulf Union which would 
co-operate on foreign policy and defence, as well 
as on trade and currency. The idea was supported 
by Bahrain – but only Bahrain. The other states all 
2 For a study of the manipulation of sectarian identities by 
the Bahraini and Saudi regimes during the Arab Spring, 
see T. Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf: Bahrain, Saudi 
Arabia, and the Arab Spring That Wasn’t (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2013).
have had objections, due not only to their fear that 
such a structure could increase Saudi ambitions 
to dominate the smaller GCC states but also to 
their divergent priorities in foreign policy. While 
Qatar gave support to the Muslim Brotherhood, 
infuriating Saudi Arabia, strong reservations 
about the union were voiced in Kuwait in the name 
of preservation of the country’s parliamentary 
system, and in the UAE. Oman went even further 
and in November 2013 declared that it would not 
prevent the upgrading of the GCC into a union of 
six countries but would “not be part of it” if it were 
to happen.3
DIVERGENCES OF VIEWS TOWARD IRAN
While the creation of the GCC had its raison 
d’être as a reaction to the Islamic revolution in 
Iran and the Iran-Iraq war, overall a heterogenic 
combination of shared interests and shared 
concerns, suspicion and familiarity, ideological 
and geopolitical contrasts and pragmatism leaves 
the GCC with a confused attitude vis-à-vis Tehran. 
The approach of a number of GCC rulers remains 
marked by Iran’s foreign policy of exporting the 
Islamic revolution in the 1980s and suspicion 
(varying over time) of Tehran’s interference in the 
Gulf monarchies’ domestic politics in support of 
local Shi‘i minorities. While this perceived threat 
posed by Iran to the GCC countries’ internal 
stability does not impede some common narrative 
about Iran, it is not shared to the same extent and 
in the same way by the monarchies, which explains 
their different attitudes toward Tehran. While 
Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have been the states 
in the GCC least open to Iran’s recent tentative 
3 This was the second such statement by Oman, following 
the Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs Yusuf bin 
‘Alawi’s clarification in June 2012 that “the GCC union 
does not exist” and “subsists only among journalists” 
(H. al-Hina’i and E. al-Shidi, “Yusuf bin ‘Alawi: “La 
yujad ittihad”… wa-l-lajna “intahat” [Yusuf bin ‘Alawi: 
“The Union Does Not Exist”… and the Committee 
“Ended”], ‘Uman, 3 June 2012: 13).
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international rehabilitation – viewing the United 
States’ rapprochement with Iran as a zero-sum 
game which could impact their own partnership 
with Washington – Oman has been the most open. 
The multidimensionality in the relations between 
the GCC monarchies and Iran is best exemplified 
by the UAE’s relationship with Iran.
Because of Dubai’s regional role as a re-export 
hub and its massive Iranian business community,4 
the UAE was the second most affected country, 
after Iran itself, by international sanctions 
against Tehran. Between 2009 and 2014, business 
between the countries plunged by 83% 5 On the 
other hand, Abu Dhabi, which has branded Iran 
a threat to stability and national security since 
Tehran’s seizure in 1971 of the three islands of 
Abu Musa and Greater and Lesser Tunbs,6 has for 
long been one of the most intransigent vis-à-vis 
the concessions made in the nuclear negotiations. 
In 2010, the UAE ambassador to Washington, 
Yusef al-‘Otaiba, publicly endorsed the possibility 
of military action against Iran.7 Following the 
2009 financial crisis and the rescue of Dubai by 
a $20 billion bailout from Abu Dhabi, Dubai had 
no other choice than to rigorously comply with 
sanction measures on commercial transactions 
and smuggling with Iran.
Of all the GCC members, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain 
demonstrate the most wariness and distrust 
toward Iran and the possibility of ending Tehran’s 
isolation. To this is added the rivalry since 1979 
4 More than 10,000 firms in the emirate have Iranian 
ownership, according to Dubai’s Iranian Business 
Council. Ethnic Iranians account for 15 percent of its 
population (L. al-Nahhas, “Iran Merchants in Dubai 
Eagerly Await Sanctions Relief,” Agence France-Presse, 
14 July 2015).
5 J. Tirone, I. Lakshmanan and K. Foroohar, “Iran Nuclear 
Deal Leaves Obama, Rouhani Seeking Support,” 
Bloomberg Business, 25 November 2013.
6 All the GCC countries support the UAE’s claim on the 
islands.
7 E. Lake, “U.A.E. Diplomat Mulls Hit on Iran’s Nukes,” 
Washington Times, 6 July 2010.
between monarchic Saudi Arabia and republican 
Iran for the political-religious leadership in the 
Muslim world and for regional hegemony in 
the post-Arab Spring Middle East. Saudi and 
Bahraini leaders frequently refer to the crucial 
role played by Iran in the early 1980s in organising 
the political arm of the Shirazi movement in the 
Gulf monarchies, and in particular to the plot 
against Bahrain’s ruling dynasty in December 
1981 by the Islamic Front for the Liberation of 
Bahrain. In 2008, according to State Department 
cables released by WikiLeaks, King ‘Abd Allah 
urged the United States to strike in Iran and spoke 
of the need to “cut off the head of the [Iranian] 
snake.”8 During the 2011 popular peaceful protests 
in Bahrain, the Iranian card, and Iran’s alleged 
local supporters like the al-Wifaq political society, 
were used as a foil to convince both the Sunnis 
and secular Shi‘a in Bahrain and the international 
community that the current regime, despite being 
authoritarian, was the lesser of two evils. This went 
with the development of a very anti-Iranian and 
(anti-Shi‘i) rhetoric in many Saudi and Bahraini, 
but also Kuwaiti and Emirati, media.
The Shi‘a in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have long 
been perceived as having a historical experience 
of discrimination and deprivation of social 
opportunities, while the situation of their co-
religionists in the other Gulf monarchies offers 
a very different picture. In Kuwait, the United 
Arab Emirates and Oman, wealthy Shi‘i families 
play a prominent role in the economic and 
financial systems of the state and even enjoy top 
political positions. These three regimes have 
been less inclined than their Bahraini and Saudi 
counterparts to see Iranian Trojan horses in 
their domestic Shi‘i minority. Shi‘i groups in 
Kuwait, Oman and the UAE have been invaluable 
allies of the rulers throughout the twentieth and 
8 “Saudi King Abdullah and Senior Princes on 
Saudi Policy Towards Iraq,” US Diplomatic Cable 
08RIYADH649_a (available at: https://wikileaks.org/
plusd/cables/08RIYADH649_a.html).
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twenty-first centuries, and have vested interests in 
maintaining the existing political order.
At the other end of the spectrum, Sultan Qaboos 
of Oman has always considered that there is no 
long-term alternative to peaceful coexistence 
between the two shores of the Gulf. Oman did not 
cease diplomatic relations with Tehran after the 
Islamic Revolution in 1979 and from the creation 
of the GCC was hostile to any transformation 
of the organisation into an anti-Iran coalition.9 
Not only has Muscat contended that the Iranian 
government in its current form is here to stay 
but it has also rejected the idea that Iran poses a 
fundamental threat to the region. The sultanate 
considers that it has no reason not to believe Iran’s 
assurances that its nuclear programme has purely 
civilian purposes.10 As a consequence, according 
to Omani officials, political and military threats 
posed by Iran to the GCC states can only be 
deterred by cooperation and de-escalation. Oman 
also played an important role in facilitating the 
conclusion of the Iran-P5+1 nuclear deal in 
November 2013. When this was signed, the US 
media revealed that secret meetings between US 
and Iranian officials had taken place in Muscat 
since March 2013.
The Omani attitude towards Iran is compounded 
by their sharing of the sovereignty of the Strait of 
Hormuz, through which approximately one-third 
of the world’s sea-borne trade in crude petroleum 
passed in 2014. In August 2010 the two countries 
signed a defence co-operation agreement in 
which in particular they agreed to hold joint 
military exercises and to increase their exchange 
of border intelligence and information. Under 
this security pact, the Iranian and Omani navies 
held joint military exercises in the Sea of Oman 
9 J. Townsend, “Le sultanat d’Oman; vers la fin d’un 
particularisme séculaire ?”Maghreb-Machrek, n.94 
(1981).
10 Oman’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Positions of 
the Sultanate,” 22 September 2013 (Available at: http://
www.mofa.gov.om/?cat=124&lang=en).
in April 2014 for the fourth consecutive year. In 
Tehran in October 2014, the defence ministers 
of the two countries signed a new memorandum 
of understanding intended to tackle drug and 
human trafficking and to serve as a framework 
for closer military cooperation in the future. 
In May 2015, Oman’s Minister Responsible for 
Foreign Affairs Yusuf bin ‘Alawi and his Iranian 
counterpart Muhammad Javad Zarif announced 
the countries had demarcated a 450-km section 
of their maritime border that had not previously 
been defined.
Sultan Qaboos’s eternal gratitude for the Shah’s 
decisive military effort during the Dhofar war has 
also clearly been a crucial factor here. No other 
state in the region (apart from Jordan) played 
a comparable role in helping Sultan Qaboos at 
that time. Last but not least, Oman’s increasing 
dependence on Iran for gas has given it a particular 
interest in maintaining good relations. A 25-year 
gas deal valued at around USD60 billion has been 
signed, according to which Iran will supply ten 
billion cubic meters of gas annually to Oman via a 
350km pipeline linking southern Iran to the port 
of Sohar.
Like Oman, Qatar’s policy towards Iran has been 
determined by the consideration that it has no 
interest in presenting Iran as the sole source of 
regional tensions and that “maintaining a healthy 
relationship with Iran […] is of paramount 
strategic importance.”11 This is explained by the 
sharing of the North Dome/South Pars field, the 
world’s largest gas field, the exploitation of which 
has been crucial to Qatar’s prosperity for the last 
twenty years. Qatar’s public welcoming of the 
Iran-P5+1 nuclear deal in July 2015 has its roots 
in its long-term vital strategic interests in keeping 
a friendly relationship with Tehran, even though 
11 F. Ayub, “Introduction,” in “Post-Nuclear: The Future 
for Iran in its Neighbourhood,” European Council on 
Foreign Relations, December 2014: 4 (Available at:
http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR120_GULF_ANALYSIS.
pdf)
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until recently it has been devoid of substantial 
cooperation. Another factor explaining Qatar’s 
desire to maintain a cordial relationship has to 
do with the fear that tensions with Iran may 
induce Sunni-Shi‘i frictions inside the country, 
although the Shi‘a, which represent 10 percent 
of Qatari nationals, have no past record of 
participation in opposition movements and enjoy 
religious freedom. The creation of a Joint Free 
Economic Area in the Iranian region of Bushehr 
was announced in July 2014 and the two parties 
insisted on their readiness to invest in linking the 
ports of Bushehr in Iran and al-Ruwais in Qatar.
With a large Shi‘i minority (estimated at 20-25 
percent of its population) historically composed of 
merchant classes close to the ruling family, but also 
a significant presence of Sunni political groups and 
individuals suspected of funding jihadism in Syria 
and Iraq, Kuwait sees no point in making an enemy 
of Iran either. While Kuwait has had to be more 
receptive to Saudi fears regarding Iran than Oman 
and Qatar have been, the Kuwaiti Emir’s visit to 
Iran in May 2014, the first such by a Kuwaiti ruler 
since 1979, was interpreted as an effort to mediate 
between Tehran and Riyadh. On this occasion, 
Kuwaiti officials suggested that “Gulf countries’ 
links with Iran should be on a bilateral level, not 
as a bloc,”12 which is something welcomed by 
Iran but that Saudi Arabia wants to avoid like the 
plague. President Rouhani and Emir Sabah issued 
a joint statement in which they “expressed their 
satisfaction over the march of bilateral relations” 
and described the visit as a “turning point in the 
relations between the two nations,”13 following the 
signing of several trade and security agreements 
and memoranda of understanding.
12 A. Hammond, “The United Arab Emirates, Qatar, 
Oman, and Kuwait: The Gulf Front Weakens,” in ibid.: 
15. 
13 “Kuwait, Iran Vow Joint Work to Develop Ties,” Kuwait 
News Agency (KUNA), 2 June 2014.
THE SAUDI CLAIM FOR REGIONAL 
HEGEMONY
On the occasion of the Camp David summit with 
the GCC countries in May 2015, US President 
Barack Obama worked hard to reassure his allies 
over the Iranian nuclear deal, since the possibility 
of a grand bargain at the expense of the Arab 
monarchies was a cause of concern in various 
GCC capitals. The conclusion of an agreement on 
the Iranian nuclear issue indeed conceals a great 
deal of anxiety, in Riyadh in particular. Together 
with Israel, Saudi Arabia is the country that most 
actively tried to delay the talks and lobbied against 
the agreement. The Saudi leadership, together with 
the Bahraini one, fears that loosening sanctions 
will enable Tehran to become more confident in the 
regional arena and push its influence – in a word, 
to challenge Saudi Arabia’s sphere of influence in 
the Gulf and wider West Asia. However Iranian 
foreign policy has no longer anything to do with 
its foreign policy of the 1980s which concentrated 
on exportation of the Islamic Revolution.
A key determinant of Iranian foreign policy after 
the Islamic Revolution – and to a large extent, until 
now – has been its resistance to the United States 
and to its allies in the Middle East. In order to 
achieve these goals, Iran has been providing direct 
military and financial support to allied groups or 
parties, either because they have been sympathetic 
to Iran’s geopolitical goals (e.g. Bashar al-Assad’s 
regime in Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Shi‘i 
militias in Iraq) or because they have opposed 
Iran’s enemies (e.g. Hamas). However, the regime 
of international sanctions imposed on Iran has had 
a significant impact on its foreign policy. Despite 
its revolutionary rhetoric, it has been governed by 
pragmatic more than ideological considerations. 
Mirroring the feeling experienced in various GCC 
capitals toward Iran, a key driver of Iranian foreign 
policy has been the perception of a threat to the 
regime posed by the United States and its allies in 
the name of the country’s national interest but also 
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out of diplomatic isolation. As Mehran Kamrava 
explains, “Iranian foreign policy has been reactive 
at best and filled with empty but unwelcomed 
rhetoric at worst.”14 In particular, frequent 
provocative and absurd statements emerging 
from Tehran15 only fuel regional tensions by 
feeding into the narrative of Iran’s imperialistic 
ambitions, and are in return used to stoke more 
poisonous rhetoric. More generally, Tehran takes 
great delight in relaying information related to the 
harsh repression that has been taking place against 
the Bahraini opposition and Saudi activists from 
the Eastern Province, and in vocally condemning 
the Bahraini and Saudi governments’ handling of 
protests. However, in a context where the velayat-e 
faqih doctrine16 has long ceased to be a guiding 
star, this strategy of adding fuel to the fire has the 
advantage of maintaining much ambiguity about 
its actual capacity for influence. Bahrain and 
Yemen are certainly not Syria and Lebanon; the 
al-Wifaq society, and even the al-Wafa’ movement 
in Bahrain, are certainly not Hezbollah. Despite 
its desperate efforts to portray itself as a regional 
mastermind, because of its diplomatic isolation 
Iran’s political appeal is out of proportion to what 
it may have been in the 1980s, and its nuisance 
capacity is probably more imagined than real.
Yemen, where Iran’s actual role has been anything 
but obvious, has been the perfect example of 
this. Claims that the Houthis were linked to 
Iran can be traced back to 2009, when the Saudi 
forces suffered humiliating setbacks during their 
military incursion into Yemeni territory to fight 
the Houthis. As a convenient way to save face 
14 M. Kamrava, “What Iran Needs to Do Now,” CIRS 
Analysis, 14 April 2015 (available at:
 http://cirs.georgetown.edu/news-cirs/what-iran-needs-do-
now).
15 As exemplified by regular claims from more or less 
senior Iranian officials that Bahrain should be the 
fourteenth province of Iran.
16 Literally “the guardianship of the jurists,” this doctrine 
in Shi‘i Islam is the current political system in Iran and 
gives political leadership to the jurist in Islamic law.
and find a flattering explanation for their more 
than embarrassing incapacity to overcome what 
was not considered more than a tribal militia, 
the Saudi and Yemeni governments repeatedly 
accused Tehran of supporting the Houthis, despite 
the United States’ unambiguous scepticism about 
these allegations.17 While Iranian officials denied 
interference in the war, the Iranian media were not 
shy at celebrating the Houthis’ “heroic resistance” 
– thereby implicitly confirming the accusation 
of Tehran’s support but, more importantly, 
presenting Iran as a key player at little expense. 
Even in 2015, as Gabriele vom Bruck explains, 
the Iranian influence in Yemen is “trivial. The 
Houthis want Yemen to be independent, […] they 
don’t want to be controlled by Saudi Arabia or the 
Americans, and they certainly don’t want to replace 
the Saudis with the Iranians. I don’t think the 
Iranians have influence in their decision-making. 
It’s not a relationship like that between Iran and 
Hezbollah.”18 The last International Crisis Group 
report on Yemen also points out that the Houthis 
“are less dependent on Tehran than Hadi and his 
allies are on Riyadh, but on today’s trajectory, their 
relative self-sufficiency will not last long. They are 
already soliciting Iranian financial and political 
support.”19
In order to legitimise the 2015 military intervention, 
Saudi Arabia has tried to frame it as an Arab 
defence front against Persian expansionism,20 
and also as a Sunni-Shi‘i confrontation (even 
though Pakistan – despite being a strong Saudi 
ally – and Turkey refused any involvement in the 
war, while Egypt was not eager, to say the least, to 
17 B. Whitaker, “Yemen, the US and the Houthis. What the 
Wikileaks Cables Reveal,” al-Bab, 6 April 2015.
18 Quoted in G. Viscusi, P. Donahue and J. Walcott, “Saudi 
Claims on Iran’s Role in Yemen Face Skepticism in 
West,” Bloomberg, 14 April 2015.
19 International Crisis Group, “Yemen at War,” Middle 
East Briefing no.45, 27 March 2015.
20 Despite the fact that Algeria, Tunisia, Lebanon, Syria, 
Iraq and Oman, among others, refused to participate in 
the coalition.
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enter the conflict). However, beyond Iran’s actual 
or imagined involvement, the goal of the Saudi-
led military intervention is instead to maintain 
the continuity of authoritarian governance in 
the region by actively repressing the forces that 
threaten to undo the status quo in a weak Yemen. 
By emphasising the security issues, most of those 
present at the Arab League Summit in March 2015 
were mostly eager to turn the page on the Arab 
Spring and its calls for structural political changes. 
CONCLUSION
Beyond this common understanding among GCC 
rulers that cohesion must prevail in a time of 
internal peaceful protests, as exemplified by the 
signature in November 2012 of a GCC security 
pact strengthening cooperation and mutual 
assistance in security matters,21 structural political 
divergences on strategic interests remain. While 
Riyadh writers and leaders continue to promote 
an image of Saudi Arabia as the Big Sister of 
the other monarchies, this unwelcome Saudi 
tutelage has been something that the smaller GCC 
monarchies (except Bahrain, to some extent) have 
been resisting. This contributes to explaining 
why – even though most Gulf regimes remain 
wary of Iran – Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and even 
the UAE all want an improvement in relations, 
and are aware that they have much to gain from 
a nuclear agreement. Not only would any chance 
of an Iranian nuclear weapon be put off, but so 
would Iran’s temptation to exploit and exacerbate 
regional tensions. Iran’s reintegration into the 
international community would hopefully prepare 
the ground for long-term resolutions of crises like 
those in Iraq and Syria which need a combination 
of all regional and international parties, and the 
collateral impacts (like ISIS) of which are vital 
threats for all the GCC monarchies. Last but not 
least, a nuclear deal would make new human, 
security and business exchanges and cooperation 
between the two shores of the Gulf possible again.
21 The pact, which has been ratified by all the regimes 
except Kuwait so far, allows the hunting down of those 
who are outside the law or the system, or who are 
wanted by party states, regardless of their nationalities, 
and the taking of necessary measures against them. It 
also allows the integration of the signatories’ security 
apparatuses to provide support during times of security 
disturbances and unrest in a signatory state. Since 
January 2015, at least three Kuwaiti opposition figures, 
social media activists and heads of political movements 
have been detained at the request of the Saudi authorities 
(cf. M. al-Rasheed, “Kuwaiti Activists Targeted under 
GCC Security Pact,” al-Monitor, 20 March 2015).
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